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THE REGULATION OF INDECENT TELEPHONIC
COMMUNICATION: HELMS AMENDMENT SLIGHTS
FIRST AMENDMENT TO SILENCE DIAL-A-PORN
I. INTRODUCrION
The First Amendment of the Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."'
Although the plain language of the First Amendment appears to create an
absolute protection for free speech, the United States Supreme Court "has
consistently held that 'abridging' and 'the freedom of speech' require
interpretation and that restraints on free expression may be 'permitted for
appropriate reasons. ' 2  Thus, the Court has analyzed restraints on free
expression by drawing distinctions between content-based restrictions and
content-neutral restrictions,3 and by drawing further distinctions between
"high" and "low" value expression within the realm of content-based
restrictions.4 Through this process, the Court has defined many categories
of expression which are either unprotected or only marginally protected by
the First Amendment.5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. L
2. GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL, CONSTnUTIONAL LAW 1011 (2d ed. 1991) (citing Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976)).
3. Id. at 1024. "Content-based restrictions restrict communication because of the message
conveyed .... Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, restrict communication without
regard to the message conveyed." I4
4. Id "The Court has long adhered to the view that there are certain categories of expression
that do not appreciably further the values underlying the first amendment." I
5. STONE, supra note 2, at 1024. In addition to focusing upon the type of expression which
the government may restrict, the Court has often focused on the means of suppression. Id. at
1120. Thus, courts have relied upon the doctrines of overbreadth, vagueness, and prior restraint
to "invalidate restrictions on expression because the means of suppression are impermissible even
though the particular speech at issue might constitutionally be restricted by some other means."
Id. at 1120-21. A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it "'does not aim specifically at evils
within the allowable area of [government] control, but... sweeps within its ambit other activities
that constitute an exercise' of protected expressive or associational rights." LAURENCE H. TRBE,
AMERIcAN CONSTITUONAL LAw 1022 (2d ed. 1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)). Furthermore, a statute will be held void for vagueness "if
it is so vague that persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."' Id at 1033 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926)). Finally, the prior restraint doctrine "imposes a special bar on attempts to suppress
speech prior to [expression], a bar that is distinct from the scope of constitutional protection
accorded the material after [expression]." Id. at 1040. Thus, "any 'system of prior restraints
... bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."' Id. at 1041 (quoting Bantam
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined long ago that "obscenity"
is not included within the bounds of constitutionally protected speech.6
However, in Cohen v. Califomia, the Court recognized that profane,
offensive language which does not rise to the level of "obscene" is worthy
of receiving First Amendment protection.8 Furthermore, in FCC v. Pacifi-
ca Foundation,9 the Court defined a category of speech which is "inde-
cent" but not "obscene," but clearly determined that "indecent" speech was
to receive only limited First Amendment protection.1"
Since these decisions, determining the amount of protection to extend
to various forms and mediums of communication has been an ongoing
challenge for the legal system." With the development of the dial-a-porn
industry," the legal system has been challenged with questions concerning
the amount of First Amendment protection to extend to indecent telephonic
communication." Thus, the dial-a-por industry, armed with limited First
Amendment protection for indecent speech, has been defending itself
against repeated Congressional attempts to regulate the industry for the past
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
6. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957). Later, in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), the Court established the following test for obscenity:
(a) [WMlether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id at 24 (citation omitted).
7. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
8. Id at 20, 24-26 (reversing the criminal conviction of a man for wearing a jacket bearing
the words 'Tuck the Draff' in a courthouse).
9. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10. 1I at 744-48 (upholding the FCC's sanctions against a radio station for the afternoon
broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue). The Court adopted the following test
for indecency: "[L]anguage that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contem-
porary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs,
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Id. at
732 (citing In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d
94, 98 (1975)).
11. John C. Cleary, Telephone Pornography: First Amendment Constraints on Shielding
Children from Dial-A-Porn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 503 (1985).
12. "'Dial-a-porn' is the colloquial name for telephone services that provide sexually explicit
recorded messages to callers." Elizabeth J. Mann, Comment, Telephones, Sex, and the First
Amendment, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1221, 1221 (1986).
13. Jeffrey L. Reed, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment Protected for Indecent
Speech-Dial-A-Porn, 57 TENN. L. REV. 339, 342 (1990).
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decade. 4
During the 1980's, the dial-a-por industry successfully thwarted four
successive attempts to regulate its use of indecent telephonic communica-
tion.5  However, the latest regulation, the Helms Amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934,16 was recently found constitutional in
decisions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Dial Information
Services v. Thornburgh' and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC.'a Many people involved with
the dial-a-porn industry believe that these decisions will seriously damage,
if not destroy, the dial-a-por industry. 19 Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Second Circuit decision,1° thereby
leaving the finding of constitutionality intact.
This Note discusses the historical development of dial-a-por regula-
tions and the cases interpreting those regulations.21 This Note then
discusses the recent Second and Ninth Circuit decisions declaring the Helms
Amendment constitutional, analyzes these decisions, and finds that both
decisions are inconsistent with well-established precedent' This Note
contends that, although the Helms Amendment may appear reasonable at
first glance, it does not pass constitutional muster in light of precedent.
Therefore, this Note concludes that both courts should have declared the
Helms Amendment unconstitutional.'
I1. BACKGROUND
In 1980, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") ordered
14. Cindy L. Petersen, Note, The Congressional Response to the Supreme Court's Treatment
of Dial-A-Porn, 78 GEO. L. 2025, 2026 (1990).
15. See discussion infra part 11.
16. Pub. L. No. 101-166, title V, § 521(1), 103 Stat. 1192 (1989) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 1991)); see discussion infra part 13.
17. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); see also discussion
infra part IHLA.
18. 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991); see also discussion infra part UI.B.
19. Nick Selby, a lawyer representing the dial-a-por companies, stated that .'[a]s a practical
matter, the industry is history, a thing of the past.' David S. Savage, 'Dial-a-Porn' Dealt High
Court Setback, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at A13; see also infra notes 169-74 and accompanying
text.
20. Dial Info. Servs. v. Barr, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
21. See discussion infra part IL
22. See discussion infra part HI.
23. See discussion infra part IV.
24. See discussion infra part V.
19921
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American Telephone and Telegraph to divest itself of "information access
services."' In 1982, the FCC allowed private companies to offer these
services competitively.6 These events led to the creation of many
privately owned information access services offering a variety of services,
including services colloquially known as "dial-a-porn." In 1983, dial-a-
porn first became available on a national basis through a New York
information access service called High Society.'
Peter F. Cohalan, the County Executive for Suffolk County, New
York, instigated efforts to regulate dial-a-porn by bringing an action against
Carlin Communications, Inc. ("Carlin") and the FCC in a New York State
court. 9 However, the action was dismissed, so Cohalan joined efforts
with Congressman Thomas J. Bliley (R-Va.) to attack Carlin with
administrative action. 0 This effort also failed when the FCC determined
that existing legislation did not restrict dial-a-porn. 3' Thereafter, Congress
has attempted to regulate dial-a-porn through section 223 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 ("the Communications Act")."
A. Carlin I
In response to the FCC's decision, Congressman Bliley proposed an
25. Ellen L. Nagel, Comment, First Amendment Constraints on the Regulation of Telephone
Pornography, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 237, 238 (1986) (citing Computer 1, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 71
(1980), aft'd, Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 218 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). "Information access services are services such as dial-
a-porn, dial-the-time, and dial-the-weather." Id at 238 n.10.
26. Mann, supra note 12, at 1221.
27. See supra note 12.
28. Petersen, supra note 14, at 2026.
29. Cohalan v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., No. 349011983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction on removal, No. CV 83-603 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1983), cited in Carli
Communications v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 115 n.4 (2d Cir. 1984). Carlin, a dial-a-porn provider,
was the largest information service provider in the nation at the time. Nagel, supra note 25, at
238.
30. In re Application for Review of Complaint Filed by Peter F. Cohalan, FCC File No. E-83-
14 (May 13, 1983, and March 5, 1984), cited in Carlin Communications v. FCC, 749 F.2d at 115
n.5.
31. Carlin Communications v. FCC, 749 F.2d at 115. The legislation existing at the time
prohibited the knowing use of a telephone under one's control to make "any comment, request,
suggestion or proposal which is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent." 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1982)
(amended 1983, 1988, & 1989), cited in Nagel, supra note 25, at 240.
32. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-613 (West 1991).
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amendment to section 223 of the Communications Act.33 The legislation,
as amended and passed by Congress,' created section 223(b), which
explicitly prohibited both obscene and indecent telephonic communication
to minors and authorized the FCC to promulgate defenses to prosecution.35
The FCC subsequently established that providers of obscene or indecent
messages had a defense to prosecution if they either (1) operated only
between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. Eastern Time, or (2) required
payment by credit card before transmission of the message.36 The time
channeling provision was intended to regulate dial-a-porn services, and the
credit card provision was intended to regulate live telephone services.
Carlin challenged the constitutionality of the FCC regulations in Carlin
Communications v. FCC38 ("Carlin I"). As a preliminary step, the court
determined that the regulations were content-based; therefore, in order to
be valid, the regulations had to be the least restrictive means to further a
compelling government interest." The court easily found that protecting
minors from salacious matter was a compelling government interest.'
However, the court also determined that time channeling was "both
overinclusive and underinclusive [because it] denie[d] access to adults
33. H.R. 2755, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also 129 CoNG. REc. H10,209 (daily ed.
Nov. 17, 1983).
34. The statute provided in pertinent part:
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly-
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or
indecent communication for commercial purposes to any person under eighteen
years of age or to any other person without that person's consent, regardless
of whether the maker of such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for
any activity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.
(2) It is a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the defendant restricted
access to the prohibited communication to persons eighteen years of age or older in
accordance with procedures which the Commission shall prescribe by regulation.
47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1983) (amended 1988 & 1989), cited in Carlin Communications v. FCC, 749
F.2d 113, 115 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1983) (amended 1988 & 1989); see also Carlin Communications v.
FCC, 749 F.2d at 115-16.
36. 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (1984).
37. Carlin Communications v. FCC, 749 F.2d at 117.
38. 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Carlin 1].
39. Id at 121.
40. Id
1992]
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between certain hours, but not to youths . . . during the remaining
hours."' The court also found that time channeling was not the least
restrictive means because the FCC rulemaking record did not sufficiently
explain why various alternatives would not be both more effective with
respect to minors and less restrictive with respect to adults. 2 Therefore,
the court found the FCC regulations to be unconstitutional without reaching
the issue of the constitutionality of the underlying statute. 3
B. CarlinIl
In response to Carlin I, the FCC renewed their efforts to develop
appropriate defenses as mandated by Congress. Their second effort
established that providers of obscene or indecent messages had a defense
to prosecution if they either (1) required an access or identification code
before transmission of the message, or (2) required payment by credit card
before transmission of the message." Once again, Carlin challenged the
constitutionality of the regulations in Carlin Conununications v. FCC4"
("Carlin II").
During the rulemaking process, the FCC rejected the alternative of
customer premises blocking 6 because it "did not restrict minors' access
to dial-a-porn services from telephones not so equipped" and because "the
cost for such devices should not be imposed upon parents." 4 However,
the court stated, "As the [FCC] did not consider the alternative of cost-
shifting of customer blocking devices to the service providers, . .. the
record is barren as to why the service providers would not equally have
incentives to implement a customer blocking system, which surely is less
cumbersome ... ."s Accordingly, the court determined that "the record
[did] not support the FCC's conclusion that the access code requirement
[was] the least restrictive means to regulate dial-a-porn." 9 Therefore, the
court again found the FCC regulations to be unconstitutional without
41. l
42. Id at 122.
43. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 123.
44. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699 (1985).
45. 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinaftr Carlin Ill.
46. "Customer premises blocking" is a term encompassing any "blocking device installed at
the calling customer's premises." Id at 849.
47. I at 854.
48. JLa t 856.
49. Id at 855.
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reaching the issue of the constitutionality of the underlying statute.5
In reaching this decision, the court also emphasized that the New York
Telephone ("NYT"') Mass Announcement Service relied on by Carlin was
a one-way distribution system, thus making the two-way communication
required for access codes technically infeasible." The court stated, "In
short, the FCC regulations would put Carlin out of business in New York,
[which] comports neither with this court's prior ruling, nor with overall
constitutional or statutory considerations."52 Therefore, the court limited
its decision to the NYT system, without considering the validity of the
access code regulation as applied to dial-a-porn providers outside the NYT
system5 3
C. Carlin M
Following Carlin II, the FCC again analyzed various alternatives to
restrict children's access to dial-a-porn in an effort to meet the congressio-
nal mandate. Their third effort established that providers of obscene or
indecent messages had a defense to prosecution if they (1) required
payment by credit card before transmission of the message, (2) required an
access code before transmission of the message, or (3) scrambled their
messages so that a descrambling device was necessary to receive the
messages. 5' For the third time, Carlin challenged the constitutionality of
the regulations in Carlin Communications v. FCC55 ("Carlin III").
In support of their regulations, the FCC provided a very thorough
report concerning the various possible alternatives.56 Also, NYT stated
that it planned to install a new system which would permit an access code
procedure.' Based on these factors, the court determined that the FCC's
regulations were "a feasible and effective way to serve [the] compelling
state interest" of protecting minors from obscene speech.5" The court also
determined that the regulations did not unreasonably restrict adults' access
to dial-a-porn.59
50. Carlin 11, 787 F.2d at 855.
51. Id. at 848.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 52 Fed. Reg. 17,760 (1987).
55. 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988) [hereinafter Carlin III].
56. See id. at 550-55.
57. Id. at 550.
58. Id. at 555.
59. Id. at 557.
19921
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Having found the FCC regulations to be valid, the court next
considered the constitutionality of the underlying statute. In response to
Carlin's vagueness challenge, the court stated that "[t]he use of 'indecent'
was clearly made with FCC v. Pacifica Foundationt °1 in mind."6' In
Pacifica, the Supreme Court determined that a radio broadcast was indecent
but not obscene, defining indecency as "language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times
of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience."'62
However, the Carlin III court analogized telephonic communications
to cable television, noting that several "courts have struck down legislation
limiting adult access to indecent speech on cable television."''  In Cruz
v. Ferre," cable television was distinguished from radio broadcasting
because "subscribers must affirmatively subscribe to the service and
because technology exists to enable parents to prevent children's access to
objectionable cable programs."'  Accordingly, the Carlin III court
concluded that because "telephone calls made by an individual over a
private line differ significantly from the public broadcast in Pacifica ....
the Pacifica decision does not justify the regulation of indecent telephone
messages." 66  Therefore, the court struck the term "indecent" from the
statute but otherwise upheld the statute as constitutional, thus limiting the
statute's application only to obscene speech.67
D. Sable Communications v. FCC
Unsatisfied with the Second Circuit's conclusion, Congress again
amended section 223(b) of the Communications Act." . The amended
60. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
61. Carlin 11, 837 F.2d at 558.
62. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732.
63. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 560.
64. 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
65. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 560 (summarizing Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420).
66. lkL
67. Id at 560-61. The court stated, "Were the term 'indecent' to be given meaning other than
Miller obscenity, we believe the statute would be unconstitutional." Id at 560.
68. The statute provided in pertinent part:
(b)(b) Whoever knowingly-
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or
INDECENT TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
statute prohibited both indecent and obsceqe telephone communications
directed to any person, including adults.69 Additionally, the amended
statute did not require the FCC to promulgate any defenses to prosecution
since a total ban was imposed on dial-a-porn.7 °
The revised statute was challenged in Sable Communications v.
FCC.7 The Supreme Court found no problem with the statute as it
applied to obscene speech, stating, "We have repeatedly held that the
protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech." 2
In response to Sable's argument that the statute created a national standard
of obscenity, the Court determined that "[t]here is no constitutional barrier
under Miller [v. California 3] to prohibiting communications that are
obscene in some communities under local standards even though they are
not obscene in others. 74
However, the Court had a different view of the statute as it applied to
indecent speech. The Court stated that "[s]exual expression which is
indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment." The
Court further explained that "It]he Government may . . . regulate the
content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compel-
ling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest." 6 Applying this test, the Court determined that the congressional
indecent communication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of
whether the maker of such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for
an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988) (amended 1989), cited in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 123 n.4 (1989).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988) (amended 1989); see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 122.
70. Sable, 492 U.S. at 122-23.
71. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
72. Id. at 124.
73. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
74. Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court
established the following test for obscenity:
(a) [W]hether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
75. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
76. Id.
19921
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record did not justify the conclusion that there were no less restrictive
means, short of a total ban, to achieve the government's interest in
protecting minors.' The Court concluded that the statute's regulation of
indecent speech was unconstitutional because it "ha[d] the invalid effect of
limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is
suitable for children to hear.""8  Accordingly, the Court upheld the
prohibition against obscene speech, but enjoined its enforcement as applied
to indecent speech2 9
M. THE HELMS AMENDMENT
After the Sable decision, Congress amended the Communications Act
to its current form by changing section 223(b) and adding section 223(c).'
77. L at 129.
78. Id. at 131.
79. Id. at 124, 126.
80. The statute provides in pertinent part
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly-
(A) within the United States, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by
recording device) any obscene communication for commercial purposes to any
person, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the
call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for
an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
shall be fined in accordance with Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly-
(A) within the United States, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by
recording device) any indecent communication for commercial purposes which
is available to any person under 18 years of age or to any other person without
that person's consent, regardless of whether the maker of such communication
placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for
an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.
(3) It is a defense to prosecution under paragraph (2) of this subsection that the
defendant restrict access to the prohibited communication to persons 18 years of age
or older in accordance with subsection (c) of this section and with such procedures
as the Commission may prescribe by regulation.
(c)(1) A common carrier within the District of Columbia or within any State, or in
interstate or foreign commerce, shall not, to the extent technically feasible, provide
access to a communication specified in subsection (b) of this section from the
telephone of any subscriber who has not previously requested in writing the carier
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The amendment, known as the Helms Amendment,"' absolutely prohibits
obscene telephonic communication, but regulates indecent telephonic
communication so that the message providers have "safe harbor" defenses
to prosecution if they take certain steps to restrict access to minors.' The
amendment provides for both statutory and regulatory "safe harbor"
defenses.'s
The statutory "safe harbor" defense is the reverse blocking requirement
established by section 223(c)(1) of the Communications Act." Reverse
blocking automatically blocks access to indecent dial-a-porn services from
all telephone lines unless a telephone subscriber affirmatively requests
access to these services in writing.' Telephone companies must imple-
ment reverse blocking if it is technically feasible and if they collect charges
from dial-a-porn subscribers for the dial-a-porn services. 6
The regulatory "safe harbor" defenses are those promulgated by the
FCC in response to the mandate of section 223(b)(3) of the Communica-
tions Act.' The FCC regulations establish that providers of indecent
messages have a defense to prosecution if they give written notice to the
telephone company that they are providing covered communications.88 In
addition, to complete the defense, providers must either (1) require payment
by credit card before the message is transmitted, (2) require an authorized
access or identification code before the message is transmitted, or (3)
scramble the message so that it requires a descrambler to be comprehensi-
ble.89
to provide access to such communication if the carrier collects from the subscriber
an identifiable charge for such communication that the carrier remits, in whole or in
part, to the provider of such communication.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(b)-(c) (West 1991).
81. Pub. L. No. 101-166, title V, § 521(1), 103 Stat. 1192 (1989) (codified as amended at47
U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 1991)). The amendment is named after its sponsor-Senator Jesse Helms
(R-N.C.).
82. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(b)-(c) (West 1991); see also Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d
1535, 1539 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
83. Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 1991).
84. See supra note 80; see also Infonnation Providers, 928 F.2d at 871.
85. Petersen, supra note 14, at 2046-47.
86. Dial Info., 938 F.2d at 1539.
87. See supra note 80; see also Informmion Providers, 928 F.2d at 871-72.
88. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201(a) (1991).
89. Id,
1992]
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A. Second Circuit Decision:
Dial Information Services v. Thornburgh
The regulations were first challenged in the Southern District of New
York in American Information Enterprises v. Thornburgh.90 However, the
court could not address the regulatory "safe harbor" defenses because
district courts do not have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of
FCC regulations.9" Thus, the court limited its review to the Helms
Amendment itself, including the statutory "safe harbor" defense of reverse
blocking.9 The court found that the Helms Amendment was unconstitu-
tional for the following reasons: (1) it failed to employ the least restrictive
means to effect a compelling government interest, (2) it contained a prior
restraint unaccompanied by adequate procedural safeguards, and (3) the
term "indecent' rendered the statute void for vagueness 3
On July 15, 1991, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's decision, finding the Helms Amendment to be constitutional
in Dial Information Services v. Thornburgh.4 Regarding the vagueness
challenge, the Second Circuit determined that the district court did not
accord enough weight to the FCC's interpretation of the term "indecen-
cy."795  The FCC, tracking the definition developed in Pacifica, had
"define[d] indecency as the description or depiction of sexual or excretory
activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by con-
temporary community standards for the telephone medium."" Thus, the
court determined that "the term 'indecent' as used in the Helms Amend-
ment [was not vague because it was] sufficiently defined to provide
guidance to 'the person of ordinary intelligence' in the conduct of his
affairs.
'9
The court next addressed whether reverse blocking was the least
restrictive means to regulate dial-a-porn. The district court had determined
90. 742 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938
F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 966 (1992).
91. Id. at 1259. Circuit courts have "exclusive jurisdiction 'to enjoin ... or to determine the
validity of' final regulations ordered by the FCC." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1988)).
92. Id.
93. Id at 1275.
94. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
95. Id. at 1541.
96. In re Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications by Telephone, 5 F.C.C.R. 4926,
12 (1990).
97. Dial Info., 938 F.2d at 1541 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972)).
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that reverse blocking was not the least restrictive means because voluntary
blocking98 was less restrictive on adults, yet sufficiently effective at
restricting access by minors." However, the Second Circuit stated that the
statute would be unconstitutional only if there were "other approaches less
restrictive than the Helms Amendment but just as effective in achieving its
goal of denying access by minors to indecent dial-a-porn messages.""m
After determining that voluntary blocking was less restrictive than, but not
nearly as effective as, reverse blocking, the court determined that "[t]he
error of the district court lies in focusing on means, when the focus should
be on goals as well as means."10'
Finally, regarding the prior restraint issue, the Second Circuit stated
that "the dial-a-porn provider must inform the telephone company that the
message is indecent . . in order to activate the presubscription provi-
sion." 2 Thus, the court reasoned that "[t]he Helms Amendment requires
no one except dial-a-porn providers to classify their messages."' 3
Therefore, the court concluded that "[t]he district court erred in concluding
that the statute requires [telephone companies] to classify which messages
are indecent.""°  Accordingly, the court found that the Helms Amend-
ment did not operate as a prior restraint on speech because a prior restraint
exists only "where the government imposes a requirement of advance
approval or seeks to enjoin speech.""05 The court declared the statute
constitutional,"c and the United States Supreme Court denied certiora-
ri, 7 thus leaving the finding of constitutionality intact.
98. "Under voluntary blocking ... any subscriber can have sexually explicit telephone
communications centrally blocked by contacting the telephone company and requesting such a
service, which is free of charge." Id
99. American Info., 742 F. Supp. at 1264-66.
100. Dial Info., 938 F.2d at 1541 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 1542.
102. Id at 1543.
103. I1&
104. Id.
105. Dial Info., 938 F.2d at 1543. "The schemes that have been invalidated by the Supreme
Court as prior restraints on speech 'had this in common: they gave public officials the power to
deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression.'" I&. (quoting Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)).
106. Id. at 1537, 1544.
107. Dial Info. Servs. v. Barr, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
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B. Ninth Circuit Decision:
Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC
In a similar case decided on March 21, 1991, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that the Helms Amendment was constitutional in
Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC."~ Because petition for review
was filed directly with the circuit court, the court reviewed both the
statutory reverse blocking defense and the FCC-promulgated defenses.'
°9
In finding the Helms Amendment constitutional, the court first addressed
the question "whether reverse... blocking qualifie[d] as a 'carefully' or
'narrowly tailored effort' as required by Sable.""' The court emphasized
the fact that "no blocking whatsoever takes place where the dial-a-porn
provider (1) bills directly the user of its services, and (2) accepts payment
directly by a credit card or requires an access code or descrambler..'
Also, the court accepted the FCC's findings that "voluntary blocking [was
not] an effective means of limiting minors' access to dial-a-porn services"
and that "reverse blocking was 'technically feasible."' 2 Thus, the court
determined that the least restrictive means test was satisfied.
1 3
In response to the argument that the term "indecent" was unconsti-
tutionally vague, the court relied on the FCC's definition derived from
Pacifica."4 The court determined that the term "indecency" as defined
by the FCC was "sufficiently precise to survive constitutional scrutiny.""1 5
The court also found that factual distinctions between Pacifica and the case
at hand were not material." 6  Therefore, the court concluded that the
statute was not void for vagueness." 7
Turning to the prior restraint issue, the court first determined that
telephone companies are private entities, not state actors, and thus are "free
under the Constitution to terminate service to dial-a-porn operators
108. 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
109. Id, at 868; see also supra note 91.
110. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 872.
I11. Id
112. Id. at 873-74.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
115. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 874.
116. Id at 875. The court stated, "If the indecency definition passes the void-for-vagueness
test for persons of ordinary intelligence who broadcast radio communications, it certainly must
pass the same test for those persons who offer indecent communications over the telephone line."
Id
117. Id. at 876.
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altogether.""' The court then determined that requiring adults to request
access to dial-a-porn did not constitute "restraint ' because there is no
"suppression, prohibition, inhibition, hindrance or constraint of speech by
government action or rule."".9 The court also stated that requiring dial-a-
porn services to identify their communication as indecent and to notify the
telephone company of this fact is not prior restraint because "labeling
matter as indecent under the statute or regulation does not inhibit its
dissemination one iota."'"2 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that no
prior restraint on speech existed. 2'
The final issue involved the standard of review for agency rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court summarily dismissed
as repetitive the argument that the FCC's rules were "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'" The
court concluded that, in formulating the rules, the FCC had provided a
reasonable analysis of the options."n Therefore, the court declared the
statute constitutional.2
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Insufflcient Congressional Record
In the cases leading to Dial Information and Infornation Providers,
great weight was placed on the sufficiency of the explanations given by
Congress and the FCC for including or excluding various regulatory
alternatives. In Carlin I, the Second Circuit found the regulations to be
unconstitutional partially because the FCC failed to explain sufficiently why
various alternatives would not be more effective with respect to minors or
less restrictive with respect to adults.' s In Carlin II, the primary basis
for the court's decision was the FCC's failure to consider adequately the
118. lit at 877; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
119. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 878.
120. Id
121. Id. at 877. The court stated, 'In prior restraint cases, the government typically brings
an action to enjoin speech or imposes a requirement of advance approval, censorship or licensing
of speech. None of this typical action is present here." Id (citations omitted).
122. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
123. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 879.
124. Id.
125. Carlin ,749 F.2d 113, 121-23 (2d Cir. 1984); see also supra note 42 and accompanying
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feasibility of customer premises blocking' 6 as an altemative.'27 In
Sable, the Court stated, "[Tihe congressional record contains no legislative
findings that would justify us in concluding that there is no constitutionally
acceptable less restrictive means... to achieve the Government's interest
in protecting minors."'" The Court further explained that the record,
consisting of conclusory statements by proponents of the bill, was
insufficient because it "contain[ed] no evidence as to how effective or
ineffective the FCC's most recent regulations were or might prove to
be.,129
Like the statute in Sable and the FCC regulations in Carlin I and
Carlin II, the Helms Amendment suffers from an insufficient congressional
record. No committee reviewed the bill, and the Senate only considered the
proposed bill for a few minutes without hearings or presentations of
reports. 30 Although Senators Arlen Spector (R-Pa.) and Jesse Helms (R-
N.C.) provided speeches in support of the Amendment, neither provided
evidence concerning the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of various
regulatory options.' These speeches and similar conclusory statements
made by proponents of the bill "failed to provide the concrete findings on
different regulatory options that the Sable Court mandated."'32 Therefore,
the Helms Amendment should have been found unconstitutional because
Congress did not provide a thorough analysis of all possible alternatives in
concluding that the Helms Amendment utilized the least restrictive means
of regulating dial-a-porn.
B. Least Restrictive Means of Regulation Not Utilized
It is a well-established rule that "[tihe Government bears the heavy
burden of demonstrating that the compelling state interest could not be
served by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expres-
126. See supra note 46.
127. Carlin II, 787 F.2d 846, 855-57 (2d Cir. 1986); see also supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text.
128. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989).
129. l& at 129-30.
130. American Info. Enters. v. Thomburgh, 742 F. Supp. 1255, 1262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
rev'd sub nom. Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 966 (1992).
131. See 135 CONG. REC. S15,800 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1989).
132. American Info., 742 F. Supp. at 1263.
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sion." 3  Assuming Congress sufficiently analyzed all possible alterna-
tives, the Helms Amendment is still unconstitutional because it does not
rely on the least restrictive means of regulating speech to protect minors
from the adverse effects of dial-a-porn. The Helms Amendment regulates
dial-a-porn by utilizing the statutory defense to prosecution of reverse
blocking and the FCC-promulgated defenses of payment by credit card, use
of an access code, or use of a scrambling device."
In Dial Information, the district court from which appeal was taken
"was without jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the FCC regula-
tions."' 35 Thus, the district court only reviewed the constitutionality of
the statutory reverse blocking defense. 136  Accordingly, on appeal, the
Second Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of reverse blocking alone, not
the combination of reverse blocking and the FCC-promulgated defens-
es.' 37 Therefore, the Second Circuit did not consider the effect of the
entire regulatory scheme as a whole in finding that the Helms Amendment
utilized the least restrictive means of regulating dial-a-porn.
On the other hand, in Information Providers, petition for review was
filed directly with the circuit court.13 s  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed both the statutory reverse blocking defense and the FCC-
promulgated defenses. 39 In analyzing this regulatory scheme, the court
emphasized "that no blocking whatsoever takes place where the dial-a-porn
provider (1) bills directly the user of its services, and (2) accepts payment
directly by a credit card or requires an access code or descrambler."''
Thus, in reaching the conclusion that the Helms Amendment utilized the
least restrictive means of regulation, the court relied heavily on the fact that
reverse blocking is activated only when "the provider and the telephone
133. Carlin 1, 749 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981).
134. Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. Dial Info. Servs. v. Thomburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1540 (2d Cir. 1991), cell. denied, 112
S. CL 966 (1992); see also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
136. American Info., 742 F. Supp. at 1259.
137. Dial Info., 938 F.2d at 1540-43.
138. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 868.
139. Id; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
140. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 872. Part (1) of this conclusion is based upon the
statement in the Helms Amendment which provides that reverse blocking must be utilized only
"if the carrier collects from subscribers an identifiable charge for such communication that the
carrier remits, in whole or in part, to the provider of such communication." 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1)
(1989). Part (2) of this conclusion is based upon the three alternative defenses prescribed by the
FCC: accepting payments by credit card, use of access codes, or use of descramblers. 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.201(a) (1991).
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carrier arrange to add the charge to the telephone bill. 14'
Although the above interpretation of the applicability of reverse
blocking is correct, the weight accorded to it by the court is misplaced.
The Helms Amendment states that a dial-a-porn provider has a defense to
prosecution if it utilizes reverse blocking and one of the FCC-promulgated
defenses, not reverse blocking or one of the FCC-promulgated defens-
es." Consequently, if a dial-a-porn provider relies upon a telephone
carrier for billing, it must utilize both reverse blocking and one of the three
FCC-promulgated defenses in order to establish a defense to prosecu-
tion."" However, either reverse blocking alone or one of the FCC-
promulgated defenses alone each sufficiently protects children from the
adverse affects of dial-a-porn. Therefore, two levels of regulations exist
where only one level is necessary to restrict minors' access to dial-a-porn.
Because the Helms Amendment creates an extraneous second level of
regulation, it cannot be the least restrictive means to regulate dial-a-porn.
Furthermore, the two levels of regulation cannot be reconciled with
Carlin III, where the Second Circuit found that FCC-promulgated defenses
which required payment by credit card, use of access codes, or use of
descrambling devices were not valid means of regulation as applied to
indecent dial-a-porn. 1" The Helms Amendment merely supplements
these same three defenses to prosecution with the statutory defense of
reverse blocking. Under the invalid Carlin III regulations, a dial-a-
porn provider only had to utilize one of the three statutory defenses,
regardless of whether the telephone carrier handled the billing.'"
However, under the Helms Amendment, reverse blocking must be utilized
in addition to one of the three statutory defenses when the telephone carrier
handles the billing. 47 Since the three statutory defenses standing alone
141. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 872.
142. The Helms Amendment provides: "It is a defense to prosecution. . . that the defendant
restrict access to the prohibited communication to persons 18 years of age or older [with reverse
blocking] and with such procedures as the [FCC] may prescribe by regulation." 47 U.S.C. §
223(b)(3) (1989) (emphasis added).
143. However, reverse blocking need only be utilized if it is technically feasible for the
telephone carrier. 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1) (1989) ("A common carrier... shall not to the extent
technically feasible, provide access to [indecent telephonic communication] from the telephone
of any subscriber who has not previously requested in writing the carrier to provide access to such
communication... .") (emphasis added).
144. Carlin Il, 837 F.2d 546, 560-61 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); see
also supra notes 54, 63-67.
145. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 871.
146. Carlin 111, 837 F.2d at 548-49.
147. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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were found to be invalid as applied to indecent dial-a-porn in Carlin III, the
Helms Amendment also should have been found invalid as applied to
indecent dial-a-porn because it merely attaches an additional requirement
to the same three statutory defenses.
C. Unreasonable Means of Regulation
Assuming that the Helms Amendment does provide the least restrictive
means of regulation, the Helms Amendment is still unconstitutional because
"[t]he State may not regulate at all if it turns out that even the least
restrictive means of regulation is still unreasonable when its limitations on
freedom of speech are balanced against the benefits gained from those
limitations." l" Judicial precedent warrants that reverse blocking imposes
an undue burden on adults149 and the dial-a-porn industry 50 Further-
more, the nature of dial-a-porn does not justify its strict regulation because
it does not involve a captive audience 5 ' and it generally takes place in
the privacy of the home. 52 Finally, data suggests that the general
population does not desire strict government regulation of dial-a-porn. 53
Rather, parents should bear the responsibility for restricting their children's
access to dial-a-por through the use of voluntary blocking"s technolo-
gy.
155
1. Undue Burden Imposed on Adults
In Butler v. Michigan,'56 the Supreme Court established the long-
standing rule that the government may not "reduce the adult population
... to reading only what is fit for children."157 The Sable Court applied
this rule to telephonic communications, stating that regulations cannot have
the "invalid effect of limiting the content of adult telephone conversations
148. Carlin , 749 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984).
149. See discussion infra part IV.C.1.
150. See discussion infra part IV.C.2.
151. See discussion infra part IV.C.3.
152. See discussion infra part IV.C.4.
153. See discussion infra part IV.C.5.
154. See supra note 98.
155. See discussion infra part IV.C.6.
156. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
157. Id. at 383. This rule was restated by the Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463
U.S. 60, 73 (1983).
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to that which is suitable for children to hear."' However, the Helms
Amendment has such an invalid effect.
The Second Circuit has stated that regulations on dial-a-porn must
"'permit adult access while limiting children's access, [but if] no such
regulations are feasible, then less restrictive measures rather than broader
restrictions will have to suffice to avoid constitutional infirmity."" 9
However, adult access to dial-a-porn is restricted by the Helms Amendment
because of the written application process required before access can be
obtained. This application process denies adults immediate access to
protected speech. Many adults will be inconvenienced because they must
wait for several days or weeks for the written application process to be
completed. As stated by Harvard Law School professor Laurence Tribe, "It
is one thing to protect children; it is quite another to say adults have to ask
for this kind of speech in advance.""
Furthermore, adult customers may object to having their names placed
on a list of persons interested in access to dial-a-porn. In fact, this concern
may deter many adults from seeking access to dial-a-porn. Courts have
addressed similar written application procedures several times in the context
of access code systems. In Carlin II, the Second Circuit expressed concern
"over the potential chilling effect of a written application and identification
procedure." '' However, in Carlin III the Second Circuit dismissed this
concern, stating that "tihe possibility that at some point the Government
might obtain the names of the recipients of obscene telephone messages by
subpoena is not sufficiently substantial.1 62
Nevertheless, in the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carlin
Communications,63 a U.S. Attorney attempted to subpoena records from
both Carlin and Mountain Bell regarding the identity of persons who had
accessed Carlin's dial-a-porn service." This case demonstrates that
having one's name placed on a list of persons interested in access to dial-a-
porn is a valid concern. The deterrent effect of this concern coupled with
158. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
159. Carlin II, 787 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting 105 CONG. REC. E5,966 (daily ed.
Dec. 14, 1983)).
160. Henry Weinstein, Federal 'Dial-A-Porn' Limits Upheld, LA. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at
A3.
161. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 856 n.7.
162. Carlin Il1, 837 F.2d 546, 557 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
163. 815 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1987).
164. Leah Murphy, Note, The Second Circuit and Dial-A-Porn: An Unsuccessful Balance
Between Restricting Minors' Access and Protecting Adults' Rights, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 685, 711
(1989).
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the burden of the written application process will reduce the number of
adults who access dial-a-porn, thereby reducing the content of many adults'
telephonic communications to that which is suitable for children., ss
Therefore, the Helms Amendment should have been found unconstitutional
because it places an undue burden on adults.
2. Undue Burden Imposed on Dial-A-Porn Industry
The court in Carlin I first addressed the issue of burden on the dial-a-
porn provider. During the rulemaking process for the regulations at issue
in Carlin I, the FCC rejected an access code system because it "would
place substantial economic and administrative burdens on recorded service
providers."'6 Referring to a written application process, the Carlin I
court and the FCC both recognized "that the inconvenience associated with
this practice might discourage many adults from using [dial-a-por
services], and thereby conceivably place [the] financial viability [of the
services] in jeopardy."'" Furthermore, the court and the FCC both
acknowledged that "any regulation that drives [a dial-a-porn provider] out
of business would seem to fall under Butler v. Michigan"'68 (i.e., limiting
the adult population to only that communication which is suitable for
children). These concerns voiced by both the FCC and the Second Circuit
exist today with the Helms Amendment.
People involved with the dial-a-porn industry generally believe that the
pre-subscription requirement imposed by reverse blocking will seriously
damage, if not destroy, the industry. Earl Nicholas Selby, the attorney for
the dial-a-porn organization in Information Providers, stated that the statute
"'will have the practical effect of destroying an industry.""' 69 He further
explained, "'In practice, the FCC regulations are a ban. People won't pre-
subscribe for these services because they don't want their names on a
list.9"1
70
Similarly, the owner of the dial-a-porn organization in American
Information and Dial Information testified that "'the greater majority of
165. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
166. 49 Fed. Reg. 25,000 (1984), cited in Carlin 1, 749 F.2d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
167. Carlin 1, 749 F.2d at 123.
168. Id at 123 n.19. See also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
169. Weinstein, supra note 160, at A3.
170. Id.
1992]
156 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURWAL [Vol. 13
people will be put out of business' by the pre-subscription
requirement."17' Matthew Spitzer, a communications law expert at the
University of Southern California, believes that reverse blocking "will
reduce the number of calls because it will eliminate the spontaneity often
involved in utilizing 'adult' phone services,"' 72 thereby causing "a
negative impact on the revenues of dial-a-porn operators."'73 New York
Telephone has estimated that reverse blocking will result in a reduction of
over 7,000,000 calls annually.7 4
The potential for serious financial damage to the dial-a-porn industry
is especially great since Congress expanded the applicability of the Helms
Amendment to regulate both intrastate and interstate telephonic communica-
tions. 75 Previous versions of the statute applied only "in the District of
Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication."' 7' 6 However, the
Helms Amendment applies to any telephone communications "within the
United States."1" Consequently, the potential financial impact of the
Helms Amendment is much greater than the potential financial impact of
its predecessors. This financial burden may force dial-a-porn services out
of business, thereby reducing the content of adult telephonic communica-
171. American Info. Enters. v. Thornburgh, 742 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd
sub nom. Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991). cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
966 (1992).
172. Weinstein, supra note 160, at A3.
173. 1,d
174. American Info., 742 F. Supp. at 1264.
175. The expanded applicability of the Helms Amendment also raises a question of whether
Congress overstepped its bounds in violation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The
Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several states:' U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8. However, the Court has long held that
Congress may regulate intrastate commerce if it has a "substantial economic effece upon
interstate commerce. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937).
Accordingly, Congress gave the following grounds for its action: "The inextricable
technological link between the intrastate and interstate communications networks make [sic] clear
that the intrastate networks do strongly affect interstate commerce in communications." 135
CONG. REc. S15,802 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1989). Consequently, any argument that Congress
violated the Commerce Clause is rather weak, especially considering that "the Supreme Court has
exercised little independent judgment, choosing instead to defer to the expressed or implied
findings of Congress to the effect that regulated activities have the requisite 'substantial economic
effect.' Such 'findings' have been upheld whenever they could be said to rest upon some rational
basis." TRIBE, supra note 5, at 309 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258-59 (1964); United States v. Wrightwoad Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)).
176. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1)(A) (1983) (amended 1988 & 1989); 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1)(A)
(1988) (amended 1989); see also supra notes 34, 68.
177. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(b)(1)(A)-(2)(A) (West 1991); see also supra note 80.
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tions to that which is suitable for children.178 Accordingly, the Helms
Amendment should have been found unconstitutional because it places an
undue financial burden on the dial-a-porn industry.
3. Lack of Captive Audience
When analyzing regulations of sexually explicit communication, courts
have placed great weight on whether the medium of communication creates
a captive audience problem.17 9  In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, ° the
Supreme Court held that the regulation of indecent speech in radio
broadcasting was constitutional when children were likely to be a part of
the radio audience.'8 ' However, the Court stated that "context is all-
important,"'" noting that radio broadcasting is "uniquely pervasive" and
"uniquely accessible to children."' 8 3  Furthermore, the Court "empha-
size[d] the narrowness of [its] holding," stating that "differences between
radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions" may be relevant
in determining whether indecent communications may be constitutionally
regulated.'"
For example, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Productses involved a law
which regulated mailings advertising birth control in order to protect
children from exposure to sexually explicit material.'86 In striking down
the law, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he receipt of mail is far less
intrusive and uncontrollable" than broadcasting.'" Similarly, in Cruz v.
Ferre,8 8 the Eleventh Circuit struck down legislation limiting adult
access to indecent speech on cable television' 9 The court distinguished
cable television from radio broadcasting, noting that cable television
viewers must affirmatively subscribe to the service and that technology
178. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
179. A "captive audience" is defined as "[amny group subject to a speaker or to a performance
and which is not free to depart without adverse consequences." BLACK's LAW DIcToNARY 212
(6th ed. 1990).
180. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
181. IM at 744-51.
182. Id. at 750.
183. I at 748-49.
184. Id. at 750.
185. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
186. I at 61-62, 71.
187. Id. at 74.
188. 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
189. Id at 1422.
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exists that enables parents to prevent children's access to objectionable pro-
grams.
190
Analogizing these cases to the dial-a-porn context, the telephone
medium bears a much stronger semblance to Bolger's receipt of mail and
Cruz's cable television than to Pacifica's radio broadcasting. Voluntary
blocking'9' technology exists that enables parents to prevent children's
access to dial-a-porn. Furthermore, dial-a-porn is not intrusive because it
requires an affirmative act by the person wishing to access the service.
In Sable, the Supreme Court addressed the application of Pacifica to
the medium of telephone communication. The Court unequivocally stated,
[P]rivate commercial telephone communications . . . are sub-
stantially different from the public radio broadcast at issue in
Pacifica. In contrast to public displays, unsolicited mailings and
other means of expression which the recipient has no meaningful
opportunity to avoid, the dial-it medium requires the listener to
take affirmative steps to receive the communication. There is no
"captive audience" problem here; callers will generally not be
unwilling listeners. The context of dial-in services, where a caller
seeks and is willing to pay for the communication, is manifestly
different from a situation in which a listener does not want the
received message. Placing a telephone call is not the same as
turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent
message. Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the
message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-por
service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an
unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it."
Because dial-a-por does not create a captive audience problem, an
important justification for the regulation of indecent speech in some
contexts does not exist with respect to telephonic communications.
Therefore, indecent telephonic communication does not warrant the strict
regulation imposed by the Helms Amendment.
4. Invasion of Privacy of the Home
Most dial-a-porn calls are made at home;'93 therefore, it is important
190. Id at 1420.
191. See supra note 98.
192. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989).
193. A study by New York Telephone Company found that only 1.72% of all calls to dial-a-
porn services were placed from coin lines. Carlin II, 787 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1986).
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to acknowledge the weight courts place on the individual's privacy rights
at home. In Stanley v. Georgia,'9 the Supreme Court upheld an individ-
ual's right to possess obscene films in his home, even though obscenity is
generally unprotected by the First Amendment. 95 The Court balanced
the individual's privacy interest against the state's power to regulate
obscenity and concluded that the privacy interest prevailed."9 The Court
stated, "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch." 197
Because dial-a-porn calls almost always take place in the privacy of
one's home, the Stanley reasoning should be extended to telephonic
communications. The Florida Supreme Court undertook such an extension
in State v. Keaton,'9" thereby striking down a statute prohibiting obscene
telephone conversations."9 The Stanley reasoning should be applied to
the dial-a-por context especially in light of the fact that Stanley involved
obscenity, and dial-a-porn merely involves indecency. In addition,
substantial privacy interests may also be violated when adults are forced to
apply for dial-a-porn in writing and have their names included on a list by
the telephone company.' For these reasons, the individual's privacy
interests outweigh the state's power to impose the strict regulations upon
telephonic indecency which are created by the Helms amendment.
5. Strict Government Regulation Not Justified
by Popular Sentiment
Several studies indicate that American parents place minimal
importance on utilizing technology to block their children's access to dial-a-
por. Ameritech Operating Companies conducted a survey in which they
found only 3.3% to 5.4% of households would purchase a dial-a-por
blocking device if it cost only seventy-five cents per month, and only 2.2%
to 4.5% of households would purchase a dial-a-porn blocking device at a
one-time charge of twenty dollars."' Similarly, under a voluntary
194. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
195. Id. at 568.
196. Id. at 564-65.
197. it at 565.
198. 371 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979).
199. Id at 90-93.
200. Cleary, supra note 11, at 533.
201. Carlin III, 837 F.2d 546, 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
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blocking system utilized in New York, only 4.0% of the customers
requested dial-a-porn services to be blocked when the blocking service was
free of charge.' These statistics indicate that the Helms Amendment
imposes strict regulations on an activity that the general population would
rather regulate themselves.
6. Parents Bear the Responsibility for Restricting
Children's Access to Dial-A-Porn
The Supreme Court and circuit courts have indicated that the
responsibility for restricting access to protected speech in order to protect
minors should be placed on the shoulders of parents.' On the other
hand, in upholding a statute prohibiting the sale of nude magazines to
minors, the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York2 5 stated that
"parents and others... who have this primary responsibility for children's
well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of
that responsibility."'  With respect to the Helms Amendment, however,
reverse blocking oversteps the bounds of Ginsberg. By blocking access to
everybody, the Helms Amendment completely replaces parental responsibil-
ity, rather than aiding parents in the discharge of thier responsibility.
As stated by professor Laurence Tribe, "'[Reverse blocking] is a de
facto assumption of negligent parenting .... Rather than trusting parents
to take some affirmative step to block out messages they don't want their
kids to get, the assumption is parents will be distracted or otherwise
occupied and the message will get through."'" Furthermore, reverse
blocking not only replaces parental responsibility, but also impinges on the
First Amendment rights of others. Therefore, rather than replacing parental
responsibility, the government should aid parents in the discharge of their
responsibility by passing legislation requiring the availability of voluntary
202. See supra note 98.
203. Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1542 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 966 (1992).
204. American Info. Enters. v. Thomburgh, 742 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (S.D.N.Y 1990), rev'd
sub non Dial Info. Servs. v. Thomburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
966 (1992) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Fabulous Assocs. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Conm'n, 896 F.2d 780,788 (3d Cir. 1990); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 758 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
205. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
206. 1d at 639.
207. Weinstein, supra note 160, at A3.
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blocking.' Then, parents, with the aid of the government, would
rightfully bear the responsibility for restricting their children's access to
dial-a-porn by utilizing voluntary blocking if they so desire.
V. CONCLUSION
In the past two decades, the Court has established a category of limited
First Amendment protection for indecent communication. In the past
decade, through four successive regulations of indecent telephonic
communication, Congress has attempted to push the boundaries of this
protection in order to regulate the dial-a-porn industry. However, through
the four successive cases striking down these regulations, the courts have
clearly defined the requirements for a valid regulation in this area. The
latest regulation of indecent telephonic communication, the Helms
Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, was recently found
constitutional by the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Dial
Information Services v. Thornburgh2t0 and Information Providers'
Coalition v. FCC.2"' However, both decisions are inconsistent with well-
established precedent.
The Helms Amendment requires telephone companies collecting char-
ges for dial-a-porn services to block access to these services from all
telephone lines unless a telephone subscriber requests access in writing.
The Helms Amendment further requires dial-a-porn customers to either pay
by credit card, transmit an access code, or utilize a descrambling device in
order to receive a dial-a-porn message. Although these requlations may
appear reasonable at first glance, they do not pass constitutional muster in
light of precedent. The prior cases involving regulation of indecent dial-a-
porn clearly establish that regulations are constitutional only if the congres-
sional record for the regulations addresses the effectiveness of all possible
less-restrictive alternatives. However, the Helms Amendment record con-
tains no concrete findings concerning possible less-restrictive alternatives.
Furthermore, the Helms Amendment regulations contain the same three
FCC-promulgated defenses to prosecution found to be invalid as applied to
indecent dial-a-porn in Carlin III, plus the additional requirement of reverse
blocking. Thus, the Helms Amendment is more restrictive than a
208. See supra note 98.
209. Pub. L. No. 101-166, title V, § 521(1), 103 Stat. 1192 (1989) (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 1991)).
210. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
211. 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
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regulatory scheme already found to be invalid. Also, because reverse
blocking must be utilized in addition to one of the three FCC-promulgated
defenses, the Helms Amendment creates two levels of regulations where
only one level is necessary to restrict minors' access to dial-a-porn.
Therefore, an extraneous second level of regulation is created which
precludes the Helms Amendment from being the least restrictive means to
regulate dial-a-porn.
Additionally, precedent establishes that even the least restrictive means
of regulation cannot be utilized if it is unreasonably restrictive when
weighed against its benefits. However, under the Helms Amendment,
adults are overly burdened by the written application process. This process
denies adults immediate access to protected speech and deters access by
many adults who do not wish to have their names included on dial-a-porn
subscriber lists. Also, the dial-a-pom industry is overly burdened by the
reduction in revenue which will accompany the likely reduction in
subscribership. This financial burden will likely force many dial-a-porn
companies out of business. Moreover, the nature of dial-a-porn does not
involve a captive audience and usually takes place in the privacy of one's
home. Therefore, the Helms Amendment must fail because of the heavy
burden imposed on both adults and the dial-a-pom industry when compared
to the nature of dial-a-porn.
Finally, statistics indicate that the government is imposing strict
regulations on dial-a-porn when parents would rather regulate their
children's access to dial-a-porn themselves. Parents, not the government,
bear the primary responsibility for restricting their children's access to dial-
a-porn. Therefore, legislation requiring the availiability of voluntary
blocking would sufficiently aid parents in carrying out this responsibility
without impinging on the First Amendment rights of others. For these
reasons, both the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals should have
declared the Helms Amendment unconstitutional.
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